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The term “Cloud Computing” has become very common in our daily life. Cloud computing has emerged 
with promises to decrease the cost of computing implementation and deliver the computing as service, 
where the clients pay only for what he needed and used. However, due to the new structure of the cloud 
computing model, several security concerns have been raised and many other security threats have been 
needed to be reevaluated according to the cloud structure. Besides, the traditional security risk assessment 
methods become unfit for cloud computing model due to its new distinguished characteristics. In this paper, 
we analysis the traditional information security risk assessment methods’ ability to assess the security risks 
in cloud computing environments.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since cloud computing terminology introduced by Google CEO, 
Eric Schmidt in 2006 [1], many research efforts have been 
conducted. The terminology and its related technology have 
improved rapidly from its introductory phase. The basic idea of 
cloud computing is to deliver the computing resources as utility,  
just like the electric power; where the end-user has not to worry 
about how or where these resources are created or managed. It is 
the same concept, but with information technologies where 
computing (i.e. processing, storage, data, and software resources) 
delivering as utility; in which the providers will deliver the 
computing service on-demand and the consumers will pay based on 
usage [2]. Despite, in todays, the term cloud computing is more 
popular with cloud computing storage; the cloud computing model 
will be the most spread computing model in the next few decades. 
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), the important characteristics of cloud computing include 
on-demand self-service, broad network access, resources pooling, 
rapid elasticity, and measured service. There are three main service 
models; first, software as a service (SaaS), in which the consumer 
has capability only to use and control the application and its 
configuration. Second, platform as a service (PaaS) in which the 
consumer can control the hosting environments. Finally, 
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) in which the consumer has the 
capability to control everything except the data center 
infrastructure. In addition, there are four main deployment models: 
public clouds, private clouds, community clouds, and hybrid clouds 
[3]. 
  The great features of the cloud computing model encourage 
the informatics system’s managers to immigrate to the cloud 
computing environments. Kim Mays predicted that Small and 
Midsize Business (SMB) have or are considering adopting some 
sort of cloud computing technology; according to the surveys, 61 
percent of SMBs are using cloud-based technologies [4]. 
Moreover, an IDC report says that three out of ten midsize 
organizations will adopt public cloud solutions [4].  
  Information is one of the most organizations’ important assets; 
thus, assessing the information security risk is vital for the 
organizations. Information security risk assessment is important 
because the data confidentiality, integrity and availability could be 
compromised if it disclosed for unauthorized person, or modified 
wrongly or may be destroyed. Cloud computing raises many 
security risks that must be clearly addressed and assessed before 
moving our valuable data to the cloud computing environment. 
Failure to do may lead to lose the data confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability, which may cause a serious damage to the 
organization's information assets.  
  It is essential  that every organization must have a sound risk 
management process within their business life cycle. The objective 
of the risk management is to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 
The information security risk can be defined as potential that a 
threat will exploit a vulnerability of an asset or group of assets and 
thereby cause harm to the organization [5]. A proper risk 
management process should ensure that the suitable security 
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controls have been used to ascertain that the organization can 
perform its mission [6]. There is no one can guarantee hundred 
percent of the security of information systems; however, the 
efficient and effective information security risk assessment method 
can provide high-level of security confidence [7].  
  There are many of the information security risk assessment 
methods, standards and regulations such as NIST SP800-30, ISO 
27005 and AS/NZS 4360. They are released by governmental and 
private organizations such as the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) and the International Organization for 
standardization (ISO). Despite, there is a similarity between these 
standards in the main steps of risk management, and there are many 
differences in details, phases and supporting guidelines. We can 
summarize the main steps of the security risk management as 
follows; context establishment, risk assessment, risk treatment, and 
risk monitoring and review. Nevertheless, most of the traditional 
risk assessment methodologies assume that the organization’s asset 
is governed by the organization itself and that all security 
management processes are imposed by the organization. These 
assumptions may do not apply to cloud computing environments. 
In fact, there are some main differences between cloud computing 
environments and conventional computing environment. These 
major differences make the traditional risk assessment methods are 
unfit for cloud computing environments. In this paper, we analyzed 
the ability of the traditional information security risk assessment 
methods’ to assess the security risks in cloud computing 
environments. To do that, we analyzed the cloud computing 
security threats according to the cloud computing distinguished 
characteristics. Besides, we reviewed some of the existing risk 
assessment approaches that have been used with cloud computing.  
This paper is organized as follows; the next section discusses the 
security threats that accompany the cloud computing model. 
Section three introduces some of the literature review of the current 
methods that used for risk assessment in cloud computing. Then, 
section four discusses why the current risk assessment is unfit for 
cloud computing, and the last section is the conclusion. 
 
 
2.0  CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY  
 
NIST in its definition for cloud  computing [3] mentioned five key 
features; resource pooling, broad network access, on-demand self-
service, rapid elasticity, and measured service. These five key 
features of the cloud computing model distinguish the cloud 
environment from the traditional environment. Nevertheless, many 
security concerns accompany these characteristics or the 
technologies that used to guarantee provision of these 
characteristics. In this section, we discuss these information 
security threats that make the traditional risk assessment 
methodologies are unfit to be used in cloud computing 
environments.   
  Resource pooling: Resource pooling means that multiple 
clients share the resources (i.e. Processing, storage, etc.) of the 
same physical cloud infrastructure; they get their resource needs 
from the resource pool and release them when they finished. The 
Cloud Clients (CCs) will use the resources that offered by the 
Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to manage and process their own 
assets (i.e. Data), which means involving of different stakeholders 
within the process. At this point, we want to focus on these two 
concepts and their security problems; multi-tenancy and multi-
stakeholders.   
  Multi-tenancy is the situation where an application runs on the 
CSP's server and serves the multi-client, with keeping all their data 
isolated [8]. However, the tenant's data will be located in the same 
physical memory with other tenants' data at the same time. This 
situation is very risky; it can cause a serious vulnerability for the 
confidentiality and privacy of the tenants' data. The main security 
concern is how the CSP can guarantee the isolation of the tenants' 
data. Thereby, the research efforts have different forms; some are 
focusing on how the re-engineering of SaaS application can extend 
the application capabilities to isolate the tenants' data, such as [9, 
10]; while some others are focusing on how to isolate the tenants' 
data during its processing, rest and transition such as [11, 12] and 
the developing of the security controls with considering the multi-
tenancy problem is also another form such as [14, 15]. The current 
research efforts are more about tenant oriented security than service 
oriented security, such as [13]. 
  Multi-Stakeholders: In conventional information systems, 
there is one or more of the stakeholders, but in the cloud computing 
model, there are at least two stockholders (i.e. CSP and CC). This 
fact will affect on some security factors such as the trust between 
stakeholders, the compliance regulations, the decisions of the 
security management process, and the security tasks and 
responsibilities. 
  Asset’s owner: Some security standards distinguish between 
'asset ownership' and 'asset property'. The asset owner may not have 
the property rights to the asset, but he has the responsibility to 
produce, develop, maintain and use the asset [14]. In cloud 
computing, data as asset is maintained by the CSP but it is produced 
by the CC who has the property rights for the data asset. The CC is 
the only one who knows the value of the data and its lawfulness. 
Moreover, in cloud computing, we need to distinguish between two 
types of assets; the hardware assets and software assets. The 
hardware assets are owned and controlled by the CSP, but the 
software assets (i.e. applications and data) may be owned by the 
CSP or the CCs. The client's software assets (i.e. data) are under 
the client's property rights, but it is existed on the CSP’s hardware. 
Broad Network Access: the cloud computing service must be 
accessible by any network-based appliance such as desktop, laptop, 
smart-phone and tablet device. These devices can be less 
processing power, because the processing load will be on the CSP 
infrastructure. Usually, the CCs' devices use the web browsers to 
access to the service available on the network. In case of cloud 
computing, sometimes the CC's devices need to support more 
specialized software to deal with the virtual services. However, the 
cloud dependence on the network as mean of access will bring the 
network security concerns to the cloud computing environments.  
Moreover, the concept of system boundaries will change in cloud 
computing environments. It is important to define the system 
boundaries are to ensure that all relevant assets are included during 
the risk assessment process. According to ISO27005, the scope and 
boundaries can be defined by defining the origination's constraints. 
In cloud computing, some constraints can be specified by the CSP 
such as the technical and infrastructural constraints, and others can 
be defined by the CCs such as legislative and regulatory 
constraints. In the traditional information system, the network 
devices and firewalls are used to define a clear boundary for the 
inside environment and monitor the outside access the system. 
However, this is not applicable for cloud computing environment 
since it totally depends on the network as an essential mean of 
access, and the main form of access is the remote access.   
  Besides, the cloud computing model inherits the Internet 
security threats; this is normal since the Internet is usually used to 
deliver the cloud computing services. As a result, the phishing, data 
loss, password weaknesses, botnets running on the client devices 
and username brute forcers are some examples of well-known 
Internet threats that will accompany the cloud computing [15]. 
  On-demand self-service: On-demand self-service means the 
cloud computing service is always available for the clients. 
Moreover, the cloud computing service must be modifiable by the 
consumers with minimum interaction from the provider. The 
availability is one of the most important security requirements. 
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Some clients need to be available all the time, so they select the 
cloud model to guarantee unlimited resources that support their 
availability. However, the sharing of resources between the clients 
may lead to exhaust the resources which may cause a critical 
problem for some clients. The CSP should ensure that the clients 
will get enough resources whenever they need, as the unplanned 
downtime may cause high economic impacts. Moreover, the 
availability of the system may be affected by a security breach; the 
system must be able to continue operation even the security breach 
occurs [16].  
  Rapid elasticity: Rapid elasticity means that cloud computing 
provider may at least semi-automatically (i.e. near real-time) to 
handle the sudden increase or decrease of usage. The CSP must be 
able to expand or reduce allocated resources according to the 
consumers' requirements. This operation might be done 
automatically, quickly and efficiently [17]. Many problems may 
arise with this situation, such as data remanence and virtualization 
security problems.  
  Data Remanence: The security concern is when the tenant 
scales down and releases some of the resources; these resources 
will be relocated for another tenant. The attacker may apply for a 
large amount of storage and start trying to retrieve the data. The 
cloud computing provider must make sure that the pervious tenant 
data is securely erased before reallocate the resources to another 
tenant.  
  Virtualization is enabling the providers to use one single 
physical resource (i.e. Server, storage, and network) as multiple 
virtual machines. Virtualization is not the cloud computing, but it 
is enabled the cloud computing to be more flexible and scalable. 
Occasionally, cloud computing can be existed without 
virtualization for many reasons such as seeking more performance 
[18]. However, most of the cloud computing projects are built with 
virtualization technology. Hypervisor or virtual machine manager 
(VMM) is a program that manages all the virtualization functions 
and allows multiple operating systems to share a single hardware 
host. It can be installed directly on the hardware such as Microsoft 
Hyper-V, Oracle VM, VMware ESX, and IBM z/VM. 
Alternatively, it may be running on the host operating system such 
as Oracle VirtualBox, Parallels, Virtual PC, VMware Fusion, and 
VMware Server.  
  There are many security concerns for using virtualization in 
cloud computing. The potential that the hypervisor may be 
compromised, and this may have a bad impact on all host VMs. 
This risk makes the virtualization implementation one of the 
importance of security concern in cloud computing [19]. In 
addition, the implementations of virtualization must make sure that 
the physical media is cleared before it can be relocated for another 
tenant. Moreover, the network attacks that come from the other 
VMs on the same physical server may be hard to detect. Thus, the 
traffic of the VMs must be monitored. The configuration of 
network switches and routers must be checked and maybe reset 
before relocating the resource for the new tenant. 
 
 
3.0 SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING   
 
The cloud computing model has certain unique characteristics and 
uses techniques that have raised several new risks and the need to 
reevaluate and redefine many well-defined past risks according to 
the cloud computing model [16]. Extensive research efforts were 
focused on defining cloud computing risks. Analyst firm Gartner 
published in 2008, a report on cloud computing, where it warned 
customers to select their cloud computing provider very carefully 
and to consider seven specific security issues: privileged user 
access, regulatory compliance, data location, data segregation, 
recovery, investigative support, and long-term viability [20]. Based 
on previous studies, [21] thirty-two risks were identified, some 
new, some pre-existing. Some studies on cloud computing assessed 
the security risks from the clients’ perspective and identified 
twenty-three risks [22]. ENISA published its own report on cloud 
computing security risks, which estimated risk levels based on the 
ISO/IEC 27005 standard, which were depending on risk probability 
and risk impact. The ENISA report lists thirty-five risks, which 
were organized into three categories: policy and organizational 
risks, technical risks, and legal risks [23].  
  Many researchers have proposed risk assessment methods in 
the cloud computing environment. Some of these studies focused 
on specific security problems, such as insider attacks, virtualization 
threats [24-27], data transmission with cloud computing [28] 
service-level agreement (SLA) [29, 30], anti‐virus in the cloud 
service [31], denial of service attacks in the cloud [32] and identity 
management [33]. In addition, frameworks which are used to assess 
security risks in cloud computing environments as a whole process 
have also been proposed. Those proposals varied based on their 
study perspectives. Some studies proposed frameworks that can be 
used by the CCs and even suggested transferring some risks to the 
CSP or to a trusted third party.  
  Assessing the security risk from the client’s perspective only, 
such as [21, 22] is overlooking the fact that the CSP owns and 
manages the infrastructure of the cloud environment. On the other 
hand, assessing the security risks from the service provider 
perspective only, such as [34-36] is underestimated the importance 
of involving the CCs in the risk assessment process. The CC 
opinion must be considered because they know how data security 
violations can affect them. Still, the CC cannot be involved in the 
whole risk management process because the process becomes very 
complicated as the number of CCs increases. CC participation must 
be at the minimum level and only to evaluate the necessary factors 
that affect the risk assessment results. In cloud computing, the 
physical infrastructure and sometimes the software used to process 
the data are owned by the CSP, whereas the data are owned by the 
CC, who alone knows the real consequences of losing data security. 
Thus, assessing the security risk from one side only leads to 
inaccurate risk evaluation. An ideal risk assessment methodology 
must be capable of considering the CC’s business objectives 
without involving the client in all steps of the risk assessment 
process to minimize complexity. 
 
 
4.0 WEAKNESSES OF TRADITIONAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
 
It is a fact that there is no computing model is hundred percent 
secure [37]; even though, many information security standards 
have been developed to secure the information in the traditional 
computing models. These security standards guaranteed an 
acceptable level of information security and gave an evidence that 
the best practice of information security has been used. NIST 
guidelines (SP 800-30, SP 800-39, SP 800-53), ISO 27000 family 
of standards, AS/NZS 4360, and AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 are 
examples of these security standards.  
  Actually, most of these risk assessment standards assume that 
an organization’s assets exist within that organization’s data center 
and are fully managed by the organization itself, and that security 
management processes are determined by the organization itself 
[38, 39]. However, the characteristics of the cloud computing 
model invalidate this assumption in the case of a cloud computing 
model [16]; cloud computing has many differences that make these 
standards unfit for cloud computing environments. CSP will not be 
able to rely on the traditional risk assessment methods since the 
cloud computing environments are different from the traditional 
88                                            Bharanidharan Shanmugam et al. / Jurnal Teknologi (Sciences & Engineering) 73:2 (2015), 85–89 
 
 
computing environments; the traditional risk calculation will be 
inaccurate in cloud computing environments.  
  On the other hand, the CC will not be able to assess the 
security risks of CSP system; CSP will not provide extensive 
details of its security system to hinder hackers who may be 
pretending as clients. Even though, the CSP must provide CCs 
enough confidences that he has a sound risk-assessment process 
and guarantees the security of the client’s assets (i.e. data). 
  Moreover, risk is defined as the probability of occurrence of a 
security breach multiplied by the consequence of occurrence of a 
security breach [14, 40-43]. The difficulty to apply this formula in 
cloud computing comes from the difficulty to calculate the risk 
impact and risk likelihood. The most popular way to calculate the 
value of risk impact is by assessing the possible loss if the security 
threat occurs. However, in cloud computing, CSP will not be able 
to assess the value of the possible loss, because he does not know 
the real value of the assets (i.e. Data). Which may differ from client 
to client, only the client himself, who know the actual value of the 
assets (i.e. data) and as a result the cost of its loose or breach.  
  Accordingly, let us assume for a moment that the CSP will ask 
the CC to provide their assessments of the risk impact or the cost 
of the consequences of losing the assets (i.e. data). Every single 
client will have his own assessment of his assets (i.e. data); these 
assessments will vary as the number of clients increased, and it will 
be a hard task to normalize these assessments to a specific range. 
Moreover, using a predefine scale, such as 1 to 5 or 1 to 10, may 
also result inaccurate assessments. If we do not have any equivalent 
monetary value of scale values, it will confuse the clients. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to define an equivalent monetary value for 
the clients’ assets. Always it will be there are values out of the 
predefined range. 
  Even if we assumed there are no values out of the predefined 
range, the real problem is coming from the client’s assessment. 
Sometimes it is difficult for the clients to assess the consequences 
of losing their data or assessing the consequences for their data 
breach, unless they experience that in the past. For example, if the 
CSP has an email system, the cloud client for this service can be a 
child at primary school or a manager at a big company. The email 
contains possibly worth nothing or maybe worth millions of 
dollars; it may be about a math homework or about important 
secrets that can cause a serious loss for the company if it is 
compromised. Both clients may give their email importance nine 
of ten on the consequence of lose scale.  
  Moreover, for some reasons, the probability of the risk, it is 
getting more difficult to be assessed in cloud computing 
environment; first, the users of the cloud computing systems are 
mobile users or external users [44]. Second, the CCs are accessing 
the system over the Internet, which is an open environment [45]. 
Third, the distinct clients will have distinct levels of users’ security 
awareness. Fourth, there is a great potential that the risk is coming 
from the client himself.  
  Furthermore, Samy et al. research shows that traditional 
information security risk analysis methods have many weaknesses 
[46]. It is not able to identify various types of information security 
concurrency threats [47]. Besides, it is more focused on technology 
rather than emphasis on the people and process aspects of 
information systems. It has required a lot of time and has a higher 
cost, especially with medium to large organizations. Moreover, the 
centric approach in conducting risk assessment that used with the 
traditional method is not helping the users and field managers to 
improve their security awareness [46].  
  In brief, the traditional way to calculate the risk might have 
inaccurate results with cloud computing environments and also 
difficult to be used. Thus, we need a different methodology to 
assess the risk in the cloud computing environment. The suggested 
method must be able to consider both service provider and client 
and come out with accurate results. According to Kim et al., the 
security risk analysis method must guarantee provision of two 
advantages, effective monitoring of information security policies 
and appropriate information for the future prediction for 
information security risks [48]. 
 
 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the usability of the traditional security 
risk assessment methods in cloud computing environments. The 
characteristics of the cloud computing model make the traditional 
risk assessment methods are unfit for cloud computing 
environments. The security risk assessment method in cloud 
computing should be able to consider both cloud service provider 
and cloud client during the risk assessment process; moreover, it 
should be able to assess the security risk with without depending 
on the traditional measurements. In our future work, we will 
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